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SPEECH SHOWDOWNS AT THE
VIRTUAL CORRAL
Eric

Goldmant

INTRODUCTION

This article considers the tension between free speech rights and
private property/contract rights. Neither free speech rights nor private
property and contract rights are absolute. Where they intersect in the
physical world, confusing legal doctrines usually emerge, such as the
U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing private speech at privately
owned company towns and shopping centers.' Though a bright-line
rule has emerged-the First Amendment pertains only to state
actors-the rule provides little prospective guidance because private
actors can be characterized as state actors in some circumstances.
In the online world, the speech/rights dichotomy also raises
complex issues. Online private actors routinely use their private
property (such as computers and networks) to create virtual spaces
designed for speech, though speaker access is usually controlled by
contract. An online provider exercising its property or contract rights
inevitably squelches a speaker's rights. Nevertheless, despite online
providers' capacity to exercise their rights capriciously, courts so far
have unanimously held that private online providers are not state
actors for First Amendment purposes.2
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I.

See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. Nat'l

Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972);
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.s. 501 (1946).
2.

See, e.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000);

Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc. 119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Nat'l A-I
Adver. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. N.H. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Am. Online, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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With the emergence of virtual worlds, we must once again
consider the speech/rights balance. To strike the balance, we must
decide if virtual worlds are more like physical world company towns
or shopping centers or just another category of online providers.
Some commentators, most prominently Professor Jack Balkin of Yale
Law School, believe that virtual worlds are different and have argued
for limits to a virtual world provider's ability to regulate speech by its
participants? This article rejects these arguments, using a recent
incident involving Sims Online and Peter Ludlow, to show that virtual
worlds are not distinguishable from other online providers. As a
result, this article concludes that we should not create special speech
rules for virtual worlds.
I. PETER LUDLOW AND SIMS ONLINE
Sims Online is a for-profit subscription-based massively
mUltiplayer online role-playing game ("MMORPG") operated by
,, 4
Electronic Arts ("EA ). Peter Ludlow is a University of Michigan
philosophy professorS and author of the Alphavile Herald virtual
6
newspaper, which chronicled in-game developments.
The incident started when Ludlow alleged that Sims Online
participants, including some teenagers, engaged in "cyber
7
prostitution" in the game. The term "cyber-prostitution" implied that
avatars were engaging in simulated sex, but the game's architecture
8
Instead, participants
limited the participants' ability to do SO.
(including some teenagers) allegedly traded cybersex chat for in-game
currency,9 though Ludlow picked a fairly inflammatory term to make
the point.

See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in
3.
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REv. 2043(2004).
4.

The game's web page is located at

http://www.eagames.comlofficiallthesims/thesimsonline/us/nailindex.jsp (last visited April 3,
2005).

See generally F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92

CAL. L. REv. I(2004) (discussing Sims Online extensively).
5.

Peter Ludlow's university website is located at

http://www-personal.umich.edul-Iudlow/(last visited Apr. 2, 2005).

6.

The newspaper, really a blog, is located at http://ww.alphavilleherald.coml (last

visited Apr. 2, 2005). It has been renamed the Second Life Herald.

7.

See Amy Harmon, A Real-Life Debate on Free Expression in a Cyberspace City,
Muck in "The Sims Online," SALON,
Dec. 12,2003, at
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at A I; Farhad Manjoo, Raking

http://ww.salon.comltechlfeature/2003/12/12/sims_online_newspaper/index_np.html .

8.
9.

See Harmon, supra note 7.
See Harmon, supra note 7; Manjoo, supra note 7.
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Ludlow's claim received some media attention, and Ludlow
claims EA targeted him because this publicity was damaging to EA. \0
EA responded that Ludlow violated EA's rules by linking from his in
game profile to his newspaper site.II It is a little unclear exactly why
this link violated EA's rules. Some reports say the link broke the
rules because the Herald site linked to information about how to cheat
the game;12 other reports say that a rule violation occurred because the
Herald site was a commercial website.13 Based on its user agreement,
EA probably could have terminated Ludlow's account without any
justification at all,14 but EA appears not to have taken that route.
Whatever its reason, EA terminated Ludlow's account in Sims
S
Online-giving him the online equivalent of the death penalty.I
Ludlow claims that this termination was unjustified and
discriminatory because EA selectively enforced its rule against him
and not others.16
Since the termination, Ludlow has railed against EA for its
censorship. That is not unusual; many disgruntled customers have
found a soapbox in cyberspace. What is unusual, however, is that
Peter Ludlow's story became a cause celebre. His termination was
covered by the New York Times,17 the Boston Globe/8 CNN, 19 the
BBC20 and Salon,21 and high-profile commentators like Professor
22
Balkin have supported his cause.
10.

See Manjoo, supra note 7.

11.

See Manjoo, supra note 7.

12.
13.

See Harmon, supra note 7.
See Manjoo, supra note 7.

14.

It is virtually impossible to determine the exact terms of the EA-Ludlow user

agreement. However, many (maybe all?) EA user agreements contain the following language:
"EA and you both have the right to terminate or cancel your Account or a particular subscription
at any time."

See EA Online Terms of Service, at http://www.ea.comlgioballiegalltos.jsp (last

visited Mar. 20, 2005).
IS.

16.

Manjoo, supra note 7.

See Harmon, supra note 7; Curt Feldman, Q&A: Banned Sims Blogger Bites Back,
at http://www.gamespot.comlalllnews/news_6085767.html.

GAMESPOT, Dec. 17, 2003,
17.

See Harmon, supra note 7.

18.

See Hiawatha Bray, Justice Has Its Price in Sim World, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14,

2004, available at

http://ww.boston.comlnews/globe/livinglarticles/2004/01l14/justice_has its...price_in sim_wo

rid.
1 9.

See CNN: Paula Zahn Now (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 19, 2004), available at

2004 WL 72847478.
20.

See Mark Ward, The Dark Side of Digital Utopia, BBC NEWS, Dec. 22, 2003, at

http://news.bbc.co.ukl l lhiitechnology/3334923.stm.
21.

See Manjoo supra note 7.

22.

See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2075-76.
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II. WHEN COMPANIES FIRE THEIR CUSTOMERS
Why should we care that a private company terminated a
customer's account? Smart companies fire their customers all of the
23
time.
Does something make Ludlow's firing special?

EA could have had a variety of reasons for terminating Ludlow's
account, including their stated belief that he was violating their user
However, for sake of argument, let us assume that this

agreement.

claim was purely pretextual to obscure that
discriminatorily censored Ludlow.

EA vindictively and

Characterized this way, we

instinctively react negatively and emotionally to the specter of
censorship.
that

For example, one commentator hyperbolically claimed

EA "acts like a classic despot, using its powers to single out

individual critics for the dungeons and the firing squads . . . the
,,24
Herald censorship smacks more of tyranny for its own sake.
However, when cooler heads prevail, we recognize that online
providers

routinely terminate accounts when users violate their

private rules. In some cases, providers censor customers for reasons
25
If other online
- like spam prevention-that are widely applauded.
providers can enforce their private rules to curtail user speech, why
shouldn't virtual world providers be free to do so as well?
Virtual

world

advocates

typically

advance

three

principal

arguments to distinguish other online providers and explain why we
should limit virtual world providers' discretion to terminate their
customers.
A.

Virtual Worlds Are Immersive

The

first

argument

is

that virtual world

participants. may

psychologically feel that they are immersed in the virtual world and,
in some cases, spend more hours online than in the physical world.26

23.

See, e.g, DON PEPPERS ET AL., THE ONE TO ONE FIELDBOOK (1999) (discussing the

value of firing a company's least profitable customers, called "below zero customers"); Gary
McWilliams,

Minding the Store: Analyzing Customers, Best Buy Decides Not All Are Welcome,

WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at Al (describing an initiative by the Best Buy retail chain to get rid
of unprofitable customers).
24.

James Grimmelmann,

Sims Online Censors Online Journalist, LAWMEME (Yale Law

School, New Haven,Conn.), Dec. 14, 2003, at
http://research. yale.edullawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1291.
25.

See, e.g, Jim Hu, AOL Error Underscores Spam Filter Challenge, CNET NEWS.COM,
at http://news.com.coml2102-1023_3-240907.html (''Many of AOL's subscribers

May 22,2000,

have applauded the company for installing email filters that can drastically cut down on the junk
email that bombards their in-boxes. ").
26.

See Lastowka & Hunter,supra note 4, at 9.
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However, even if some participants immerse themselves in a virtual
world, we still need a reason to find legal significance in these self
perceptions. People can declare themselves part of a virtual republic
27
(and, in fact, do so regularly ), but this does not mean we should
recognize these virtual republics as sovereign equivalents. So long as
these individuals have a physical presence in the "real" world, they
remain governed by real world laws despite their psychological
declarations. The immersion argument is more an indictment of those
participants' ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy than a
reason to create new legal rules.
B. Virtual World Commoditization
28
The second argument is virtual world assets have real value.
An exchange rate may develop between in-game economies and
9
physical world economies/ giving some virtual assets a tangible,
quantifiable,

real-world

cash value/opportunity cost.

However,

virtual worlds are not unique in this regard; cyberspace is filled with
virtual assets that have real world value. Domain name registrars sell
virtual locations (domain names), web publishers sell advertisers
virtual real estate (positions on a web page), and websites even create
an exchange rate between virtual near-currency (like airline miles or
30
other loyalty program points) and cash.
Moreover,

all of these virtual assets

are built on a user

agreement. With respect to virtual worlds, almost all user agreements
give the provider unlimited discretion to change the world or
terminate the participant's access in its sole discretion. Therefore, a
participant chooses to "create" value in virtual world assets premised
on a shaky contractual foundation.

Participants still have legal

recourse for a provider's capricious actions; contract law, consumer

See Andrew Weiner, Wanted: Homeland for 300 Webheads, METROACTIVE, Nov. 22,
at http://ww.metroactive.comlpapers/cruzfl l .22.00/netnations-0047.html.

27.
2000,

See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2047. This value, in turn, may create flourishing in-game
See Noah Shachtrnan, Will
Garners Buy What Game Sells?, WIRED NEWS, May 24, 2002, at
28.

economies, in some cases expressly encouraged by the provider.

http://ww.wired.comlnewslprintlO.1294.52701.00.htrnl (discussing Project Entropria, which
encourages entrepreneurship within the game).
29.

See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 4, at 10-11, 37-39. However, some providers
See Greg
Sandoval, Sony to Ban Sale of Online Characters from Its Popular Gaming Sites, CNET
NEWS.COM, Apr. 10, 2000, at http://news.coml2101-1017_3-239052.html.
(most prominently EverQuest) actively discourage these out-of-game transactions.

30.

See Points.com, at http://ww.points.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
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However, absent

deception, contract termination rights are generally upheld, even if the
32
termination causes the terminated party to. lose value.
C. Virtual World Participants Face Switching Costs
The third argument is that virtual world participants make
significant investments in a world that creates costs to switch to
33
alternatives.
Some virtual world participants spend hundreds of
hours building relationships, reputations and virtual assets, much or
34
all of which is lost if the participant exits the virtual world.
In
theory, these switching costs could cause market failures by making it
too costly for market participants to freely vote with their wallets and
reward (or punish) virtual world providers appropriately.
Despite these investments, providers still feel the effects of
market forces for several reasons.

First, participants invest at

different levels; although heavily-invested participants get the most
attention (and make the most noise), many paying customers are
casual users with trivial switching costs.

Second, competitors can

offer marketing

programs or product features that can
35
participants-even the heavily-invested ones-to switch.

induce
Third,

heavily-invested participants who do not terminate or switch may lose
their enthusiasm for the world and decrease their contributions to the
community accordingly, which can cause the world to atrophy and
36
thereby make the community less compelling to newcomers.
Finally, word of mouth, especially about games, works really well as
a market mechanism;

if anything, the Internet (through blogs,

enthusiast/fan sites and product review sites) has strengthened it.
3L

A

See Balkin, supra note 3 (emphasizing, in particular, the role of consumer protection

laws).
32.

See Eric Goldman, Termination of Accounts in Virtual Worlds, TECHNOLOGY &
at

MARKETING L. BLOG, Feb. 13, 2005,

http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/200S/02/termination_of.htm. In Hall v. EarthLink Network,
Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005), an EarthLink subscriber used a personal email account for
business purposes. EarthLink terminated the account based on a mistaken belief that Hall was a
spammer. The Second Circuit rejected all of Hall's claims for legal redress.

See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 4, at 61-62; see also Balkin, supra note 3, at
Editorial: Simulating Free Speech in Virtual Lives, SECOND LIFE
HERALD, Mar. 4, 2005, at http://ww.dragonscoveherald.comlblog/index.php?p=693.
33.

2051, 2077; Neal Stewart,
34.

Stewart,

35.

Castronova has proposed some techniques that competitors can use to overcome their

supra note 33.

potential customers' switching costs.
NOVA, July, 24, 2004,

36.

See Edward Castronova, Switching Costs Fall, TERRA
at http://terranova.blogs.comlterra_noval2004/07/switching_costs.htmL

See Bray, supra note 18 (discussing the disengagement of Sims Online players in

response to EA' s perceived abdication of control).
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bad buzz about a virtual world will keep away prospective new
customers.37 Therefore, even if investments inhibit competitive
switching, providers still feel the marketplace effects of their choices.
Meanwhile, in other contexts, customers routinely incur some
costs to switch between vendors. With respect to some online
services (especially communication-oriented services like email, web
hosting and blogs), these switching costs are not trivial but do not
support regulatory intervention. Why should we give greater legal
significance to the switching costs incurred in virtual worlds? As
discussed above regarding commoditization, this seems especially
problematic when the participant deliberately chose to incur these
switching costs knowing that the provider could make unilateral
choices at any time.
D. Conclusion on Virtual World Diferences

Without a doubt, virtual worlds are both academically interesting
and emotionally compelling. They can have richly textured visual
environments, complex and absorbing story lines, curious denizens
and strong communities. However, we cannot let our fascination with
virtual worlds and the people who occupy them cloud our judgment.
Proponents of new rules for virtual worlds need to prove that virtual
worlds should be treated differently than other online providers. This
discussion has raised significant questions about the proffered
justifications.
Meanwhile, rules to protect virtual world participants from
private censorship could have unintended consequences. Specifically,
these rules would restrict providers' choices about how to deal with
unwanted speech. These restrictions distort providers' abilities to
make profit-maximizing decisions, which in turn increase providers'
financial risk and reduce incentives to invest in the industry.
Converting private virtual world providers into state actors could,
paradoxically, limit speech rather than increase it.
III.

PRODIGY REDUX

Once we acknowledge that virtual worlds are just like other
online providers, the arguments being advanced to regulate their
conduct begin to sound very familiar. That is because we dealt with
online providers "censoring" their customers at least fifteen years ago.

37.

Indeed, there is some evidence that Sims Online has suffered in the marketplace for

these very reasons.

See id.
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Specifically, the LudlowlEA incident mirrors a seminal event in
Internet law. In the late 1980s, Prodigy Networks was a leading
commercial online service that offered a self-contained universe of
interactive tools, such as email, chat, message boards and file
downloads. In 1990, Prodigy terminated the account of subscribers
who complained about its practices, which led to claims that Prodigy
engaged in censorship.38 Prodigy responded that it could control user
submitted content to create a family-friendly environment, just as a
newspaper has the right to make editorial decisions about what it
publishes.39
Prodigy may not have fully appreciated the consequences of its
response. By analogizing itself to a newspaper, it implicitly invited
courts to treat it like a newspaper in other respects as well. Five years
later, a court did just that. In the 1995 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy
decision, a New YorkSupreme Court held that Prodigy was liable for
user-submitted defamatory content on its network, just like a
newspaper would be liable for publishing defamatory content.40
The Stratton Oakmont decision sent shock waves through the
nascent Internet industry. Providers seeking to offer family-friendly
services felt that they would be liable if they failed to catch and
remove harmful user-generated content.
Other providers felt
compelled to implement new controls over user content even if such
efforts would inhibit the community's development or would be cost
prohibitive. Either way, the threat of liability forced providers to
increase their censorship of users.
Fortunately for the Internet's development, Congress overturned
Stratton Oakmont nine months later by enacting Section 509 of the
Communications Decency Act,41 codified as 47 U.S. C. § 230
("Section 230"). Section 230 grants online providers a near-blanket
immunity from liability for their users' content.4 2 This immunity

38.

See John Markoff, Home-Computer Network Criticized for Limiting Users, N.Y.

nMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at 01,05. The users were upset over a new surcharge Prodigy imposed
on high-volume email users, and some irate subscribers went so far as to complain to Prodigy's
advertisers.

See Peter H. Lewis, On Electronic Bulletin Boards. What Rights Are at Stake?,

N. Y. nMES, Dec. 23, 1990, at F8.
39.

See Geoffrey Moore, The 1st Amendment Is Safe at Prodigy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,

1990, at F13.
40.
41.

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 509,47 U.S.C. § 230(2005).
The major exception being, of course, intellectual property claims.

See 47 U.S.c.
§ 230(e)(2). In 1998, Congress attempted to provide some protection for intellectual property
claims via the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, but § 512 has
42.

proven significantly less useful for online providers than 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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applies whether the online provider tries to control content it deems
objectionable or not, meaning that online providers can figure out the
best way to serve their communities. With this legal protection, a
thousand online communities have bloomed, spanning the spectrum
from tightly controlled to virtually unregulated.43 This diversity has
allowed individuals to find venues that serve their needs, giving
customers the power to reward (or punish) providers for their choices.
Section 230 played a non-trivial role in the Internet's ascension as a
dominant media, a development from which we have all benefited.
Prodigy's experiences from the early 1990s teaches a valuable
lesson. We want to give providers the option to exercise control over
content they deem objectionable. As a result, we give providers a
tremendous incentive-near-absolute immunization from liability-to
exercise this option.44
Yet, those who object to EA's private
censorship want to strip discretion away from providers, just like
those who complained about Prodigy fifteen years ago. Fortunately,
we know the Prodigy story ends happily with the proliferation of
diverse and robust online communities. Why try to rewrite this
ending?
IV. CONCLUSION

Unquestionably, it is tempting to celebrate virtual worlds as
emerging utopias, but such reverence only creates frustration and
disappointment when real-life imperfections like private "censorship"
creep in. Unfortunately, utopias do not exist, not even virtual ones,45
and we cannot allow our romanticized visions to blind us to the real
enemy. The enemy is not a vendor's private censorship of a
customer, however irrational or short-sighted that may be. The real

43.

See Bray, supra note 18 (discussing Sociolotron, an adults-only game that allows

players to engage in illicit behavior that is not permitted in Sims Online).
44.

For a general policy argument in favor of letting online providers exercise discretion

over their community spaces, see Eugene Volokh,

Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the
Listener's Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377. Castronova and Balkin have proposed "interration" statutes to give
virtual world providers a safe harbor from liability if they agree to protect participant interests.

See Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185 (2004-2005); Balkin,
supra note 3, at 2090-97 (endorsing and extending Castronova's proposal). Of course, 47
U.S.C. § 230 already insulates providers for participants' actions and words, although it
excludes coverage for intellectual property claims.

Therefore, the only reasons to consider

interration is to plug the intellectual property hole in

§ 230 or to give new substantive rights to

participants at providers' expense.

45.

See Ward, supra note 20 (discussing how Sims Online was touted as a virtual utopia

but has never fulfilled that promise).
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enemy is an emotional response to private censorship that trumps
sound policy judgments.
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